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IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE O.F UTAH 
GEORGE D. EYRE, Administrator 
of the Estate of CECIL DREWERY 
EYRE, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
MICHAEL FRANK BURDETTE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 8829 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This law suit was commenced for the wrongful death 
of Cecil Drewery Eyre in an accident which took place 
and occurred on Redwood Road at approximately 6275 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at approxi-
mately 7:19 o'clock P.M. on the 22nd day of September, 
1956. At the time of the accident the decedent was an 
occupant of an automobile belonging to and being driven 
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by the defendant in a northerly direction. The only other 
occupant in this automobile was Lorene ~{assardi who 
also filed a law suit against the defendant. The two 
law suits were consolidated for trial. This accident was 
caused by collisions with oncoming automobiles. The 
road at the place of the accident is a straight, level, black-
topped highway with two lanes divided by broken lin~s. 
To the South there is a hill, the brow of \vhich is approxi-
mately 300 yards from the place of the accident. Travel-
ing South past the point of the accident, as the incline 
starts, the South bound lane widens into two lanes to the 
top of the hill and then becomes one lane proceeding 
down the hill to the South. Proceeding N o:r:th approach-
ing the hill, the North bound lane widens into two lanes 
going up the hill and at the top becomes one lane again 
proceeding Northerly down the hill. (R.-149). The series 
of collisions resulting in the death of Cecil Drewery Eyre 
occurred when the Burdette car collided first -with the 
North bound Giorgio car; then, proceeding North ap-
proximately 46 feet collided 'Yith the N" orth bound Hens-
ley car and then proceeding North approximately 199 
feet collided with the Bailey car resulting in the deceased 
being thrown out of the automobile of defendant and 
directly into the path of the oncon1ing Dr. )Iadsen car ap-
proximately 103 feet North from the collision "ith the 
Bailey car (Ex. P-1). The investigating officer, Arthur 
E. Allen, gave it as his opinion that the first point of lin-
pact was approxilnately 2 feet into the South bound lane 
of traffic. This opinion "\Vas based on a tire 111ark and 
also a line left by fluid coining fro1n the Giorgio car 
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(R-157). (Also see Exhibit P-2 showing clearly the line 
left by the fluid.) The officer further gave it as his opin-
ion that points of impact with the other automobiles 
were also in the South bound lane of traffic (R-157, 158). 
The driver of the first automobile involved with the 
Burdette car is Frank Giorgio who testified that he was 
driving South on said highway and that the traffic going 
South was fairly heavy because of automobiles proceed-
ing to West Jordan where a prize fight was being held 
that night. He stated that it was dark and that the auto-
mobiles had their lights on. He further stated that he 
was traveling in his own lane of traffic when suddenly 
an automobile came right at him and that he was hit 
while trying to turn to the right (R-203-204). His auto-
mobile was damaged on the left front and left side (Ex. 
P-16). 
Testimony was produced as to the manner in which 
the defendant's car was driven from the point where the 
car proceeded up the South side of Bennion Hill down 
to and including the collisions in which it became involved. 
Mr. Ed. Jones testified that he and Mr. Clarence Loven-
dahl were preparing to come out of his driveway at 6981 
South Redwood Road in Mr. Lovendahl's automobile; 
that his home is located at the bottom of Bennion Ilill on 
the South; that they had to stop to let a light colored 
Ford automobile proceeding North pass by; that this 
automobile was proceeding at a high rate of speed which 
he estimated to be between 60 and 70 miles per hour; 
that as the automobile proceeded up the hill it proceeded 
in an erratic course across the double center line and 
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over to the extreme West side of the road and back to his 
side of the road again and then back over the double 
center line a second time before passing over the hill. 
Mr. Jones and Mr. Lovendahl then proceeded North, and 
at the top of the hill observed what appeared to be a ball 
of fire and observed, on reaching the scene of the acci-
dent, that the car which he had seen had been involved 
in an accident (R-175-179). 
Mr. Lovendahl in his testimony added that the light 
colored car almost hit a culvert on the extreme West side 
of the highway when it passed over the double center 
line and estimated the speed of the light colored auto-
Inobile to be 70 miles an hour (R-186). 
Mr. Wilford Green was driving an automobile in a 
Northerly direction proceeding up the South side of Ben-
nion Hill in the lane to the immediate right of the double 
center line when the defendant's automobile crossed to 
the left of the double center line to pass him and went 
to the extreme vVest side of the highway by the canal 
bridge and then cut back again almost hitting an auto-
mobile on the top of the hill. ~Ir. Green observed, when 
he reached the top of the hill, that defendanfs automobile 
had come back to his o'vn side of the road and that he 
then barely edged to the East of the road and then edged 
back and cut right into the line of northbound traffic. 
He stated that he observed the collision seeing the lights 
go out and then sparks and 1nore ligl1ts going out "-i.th 
the defendant's car swerving around. Mr. Green stated 
that in his opinion the speed of the defendant's automo-
bile 'vas 70 miles per hour or better (R-188-190). 
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Mr. Melvin J. Perry testified that he was driving 
North on Redwood Road up the South side of Bennion 
Hill, in the outside or East lane when a '54 Ford, light 
colored, passed him doing a high rate of speed. He fur-
ther stated that this automobile was over across the 
double line a short distance and then proceeded down the 
hill coming back into the correct lane and then veered 
to the left into collision with a North bound automobile 
(R-196-197). He stated (R-197): 
"Q. Will you tell us how the collision happened~ 
A. As I say, the Ford just veered over to the 
left in the opposite lane of traffic, where I 
had a position on the left side of the hill to 
view it." 
Mr. Perry stated that he was approximately a half block 
from the place of the collision when it happened. Mr. 
Perry also observed the subsequent collisions which the 
Burdette car had with the other North bound cars and 
that they were all in the South bound lane. 1-Ie estimated 
the speed of the Burdette car as a "high rate of speed" 
(R-198-199). Later on on cross examination (R-200) Mr. 
Perry stated that the speed was at least 60 miles an hour. 
Deputy Sheriff Arthur E. Allen testified that he had 
a conversation with the defendant Burdette at the scene 
of the accident and that he could smell alcohol on him, 
and from his manner of speech and rationalness, he be-
lieved him to be intoxicated (R. 148). 
Highway Patrolman Vasco Laub testified (R-257) 
that he interviewed the defendant at the hospital at ap-
proximately 9:00 P.M. on the evening of the accident. 
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He testified (R-262) that in his opinion he was under the 
influence of alcohol. 
Burdette testified that he was traveling about 50 
miles an hour coming down the hill on his o'vn side of 
the highway and that the oncoming car came into his lane 
of traffic and hit him. He further testified that just 
prior to the accident Mr. Eyre and Mrs. Massardi started 
to argue and further (R-317): 
"Q. What happened then~ 
A. I turned and asked them to stop it. 
Q. 'Vas there any motion? 
A. They were jostling me. 
Q. Did the jostling have any effect on the driv-
ing~ 
A. It was interfering, and bothering and I turned 
my head and asked them to stop. 
Q. Then what happened~ 
A. Then I turned and saw the lights commg 
to,vard me. 
Q. On 'vhich side were the~ ... on~ 
A. J.\tiy side. 
Q. Then "That happened~ 
A. I had a collision and struck IllY face on the 
steering "'heel, that is all I ren~ember. 
Q. At the tirne of the collision~ ''Thich side of the 
road were you on, Mr. Burdett? 
A. On n1y side of the road." 
At R. 350 on cross examination the defendant testi-
fied as f ollo~rs : 
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"Q. It was your testimony, as I understand it, 
that this accident happened so quick, when 
you first noticed those lights, there was 
nothing you could do about it~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. It was too late to do anything at all~ 
A. I tried. 
Q. But it was too late~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you had of had time you could have done 
something about it~ 
A. I suppose I could." 
Lorene Massardi remembered nothing concerning 
the happening of the accident. 
Mr. Burdette also testified that all he had to drink 
that night were two short beers consisting of half foam 
and half beer of which he had not drunk the complete 
glasses. He stated that at the time of the accident he was 
sober, and he further testified that there was nothing 
concerning the way in which he was driving immediately 
prior to the accident to give any cause for concern. He 
testified as follows, on cross examination (R-350) : 
"Q. (By Mr. Black) It is also your testimony 
is it not, that your driving on the way out 
and on the way back was perfectly normal~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. There is nothing to give anyone any cause for 
concern there, was there~ 
A. No sir. 
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Q. And, of course there was nothing to give 
anyone cause for concern about drinking 
either~ 
A. No sir." 
In regard to the purpose of the trip, Lorene Mass-
ardi testified that she and Mr. Eyre had gone to the 
B Z B Bar where Mr. Burdette worked as a bartender 
and had ordered a glass of beer when Mr. Burdette came 
in and sat down at their table (R-229). She stated that 
they started talking about chickens and eggs and further 
(R-230): 
"Q. And then vvhat happened~ 
A. Well, we just sat there, and they were talking 
about the chickens and eggs~ and I said to Mr. 
Eyre, 'we better go get them because it is 
getting late, \ve better go and gather up the 
eggs, because it is getting late. 
Q. What, if anything, \Yas said about getting 
the eggs~ 
A. He mentioned so1nething about selling a crate 
of eggs, I don't know just how it came about, 
but the three bartenders "-ith :\Ir. Burdett-
t,vo other bar tenders and :\Ir. Burdette "-ere 
going to buy a case of eggs for the three of 
them. 
Q. vV as anything said to :\!r. Burdette about the 
price? 
A. 1\Ir. Eyre said he \\-ould sell then1 to him for 
less than he got for a case of eg·g·s. 
~ ..._ 
Q. What did Mr. Burdett say? 
A. He said that \\-ould be a good deal. because 
they could use them in the bar. 
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Q. Then what happened~ 
A. vV ell, I don't know just how long we were in 
there, "\Ve then started to leave and went out-
side, and Mr. Eyre and I started to his car, 
Mr. Burdett's was parked next to it, I didn't 
know at that time Mr. Burdett had a car. He 
said to Jack 'let's go in mine,' so we got in 
his car and went. 
Q. Then where did you go~ 
A. He said he wanted to go home and change 
his clothes, Mr. Eyre said it wouldn't be any 
use. Then we started out to the chickens. 
Q. Did you go to the chicken farm~ 
A. Yes." 
And again at R-238: 
"Q. Mrs. Massardi, will you tell me what the pur-
pose of this trip was out to the farm~ 
A. Yes. To feed the chickens and gather the 
eggs. 
Q. All right. Did you hear anything mentioned, 
or talked about between Mr. Eyre and Mr. 
Burdett, any other reason than that mention-
ed for going out to the farm~ 
A. No." 
Burdette testified that on the day in question he went 
to the BZB bar to see if he was needed for work that 
night and saw Mr. Eyre and Mrs. Massardi. He stated 
that Mr. Eyre offered to sell him some eggs cheaper 
than he could buy them; that Eyre sold eggs by the case 
k and the other two bartenders agreed to go in on a case 
with him. He claimed that the eggs were to be delivered 
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by Eyre. However, in explaining why he went outside with 
Eyre and Massardi, Burdette, for the first time, claimed 
that he was invited by Eyre to see the chicken farm and 
went for that reason volunteering to take his car (R-347). 
On cross examination Burdette testified as follows 
(R-347): 
"Q. Now, Mr. Burdett, it is true, isn't it, that you 
only had a casual acquaintance with Mr. Eyre, 
is that not true~ 
A. Just casual, yes. 
Q. That is of short duration, 
known him very long~ 
A. Not too long, no sir. 
you hadn't 
Q. Just seen him, of course, a couple of times 7 
A. Several times. 
Q. And, of course, there was no reason why you 
should just merely desire Mr. Eyre's com-
pany, or to be in his company, is that right~ 
Mr. Strong: \"\That time are you speaking of! 
Q. (By 1\Ir. Black): .. A .t the time they went -with 
you in your car 1 
A. ''Tell, he invited 1ne to go out. 
Q. I see, but the reason you 'vent out 'vas to get 
the eggs, "1"asn't it,~ 
A. .Not purposely, no. 
Q. Isn't it true you tl1ought this was a pretty 
good deal he offered you 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You agreed to buy these eggs f 
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A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you talked to the bartender and also the 
owner to see if they would cut in on this deal 
with you~ 
A. He wanted to sell a case of eggs, I couldn't 
afford one myself. 
Q. He wanted to sell these eggs~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You wanted them for use in your home~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Isn't it true in this other hearing in this mat-
ter you said nothing about Mr. Eyre inviting 
you to go out to see this farm, did you~ 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. You can't remember~ 
A. No. 
Q. Let's see if I can refresh your memory then. 
This is on page 8. It is right near the top~ 
Q. What did you do then~ 
A. vVell Mr. Eyre made me a proposition 
to buy some eggs. He said he had quite a 
few chickens out in Draper, out on a 
ranch out there, and he said he would 
make me a deal on some eggs and it 
sounded all right to me. So I asked Leo if 
he would like to buy some. 
Q. Asked who~ 
A. Leo. 
Q. The bartender? 
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A. Yes, sir, and he said 'sure' and Mr. Eyre 
said he would like to sell by the case 
rather than sell a few dozen eggs. So I 
asked Mr. Bolinder and he said he would 
be glad to buy a half a case ?f egg~ be-
cause he could use them in his business 
and in his home. 
I believe that is all-did you so testify at 
the prior hearing of this matter 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Then it is true, isn't it, that you said nothing 
at that prior hearing, at that time about )Ir. 
Eyre inviting you just to go out and look 
over his ranch' 
A. No sir. 
Q. Is it not true' 
A. No sir. l\fay I have the question again~ 
Q. It is true then at this prior hearing then you 
said nothing about Mr. Eyre coming out to 
look at this ranch Y 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. At that hearing you testified the purpose, the 
sole purpose was to go out and get those 
eggs? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You ren1arked, as l\ r r. 1\IcCn.rtY re1ninded YOU, 
you stated in this transeript. you ,vanted to 
tell the whole truth, the "~hole storY in this 
matter~ · 
A. Yes sir." 
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Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences 
deducible from the foregoing evidence. A jury could well 
have found that the 1notivation for the trip was the sale 
and purchase of eggs. In order to consummate the sale, 
an exchange would have to take place. Burdette would 
receive the eggs and Eyre would receive the money. 
Presumptively, this exchange would take place at the time 
Eyre placed the eggs in the crate and delivered the 
crate to Burdette. This exchange could have taken place 
either at Eyre's place of business, the tavern, or at the 
Burdette home, but this would be immaterial. These men 
went out to consummate a business transaction, to wit, 
the sale and the purchase of eggs. This was the motiva-
tion for the trip, the purpose of the trip, and it was 
in the execution of this purpose that the collision oc-
curred. The mutual obligations and advantages of any 
sale of property were present in the transaction here 
involved. This was not a sightseeing tour, this was not 
a social venture, but on the contrary was a business 
transaction as will be hereinafter clearly indicated by 
citation of numerous authorities. These facts taken in 
a light most favorable to plaintiff clearly established 
that the deceased Eyre was a passenger and not a 
guest of Burdette at the time of the collision. Yet, 
the trial court not only failed to instruct that Eyre was 
~·, a passenger but refused to even submit the passenger-
guest issue to the jury as an issue of fact. It instructed 
that Eyre was a guest. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT 'COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DECEASED, CECIL 
DREWERY EYRE WAS A GUEST IN THE AUTOMOBILE 
BEING DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT MICHAEL FRANK 
BURDETT. 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 INCORRE·CTLY ALLOWED THE 
JURY TO CONSIDER ALLEGED SCUFFLING BY DECED-
ENT AND ANOTHER OCCUPANT AS A DEFENSE WHEN 
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY ELIMINATED IT AS A 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON NEGLIGENCE AFTER HAVING ELIMINATED 
NEGLIGENCE FROM THE LAWSUIT. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 6 WHICH STATED THAT 
DRIVING A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF LIQUOR IS NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW-
THIS AFTER HAVING ELIMINATED NEGLIGENCE AS 
BEING A·CTIONABLE. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ALLOWING THE DEFENSE OF ASSUl\fPTION OF RISK 
TO BE GIVEN THE JURY, AND COMPOUNDED ITS ERROR 
IN UNDULY ElVfPHASIZING THIS DEFENSE IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTOR1- NEGLIGENCE IS A DE-
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FENSE TO AN ACTION BASED ON WILFUL MIS~CONDUCT 
AND INTOXICATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DECEASED, CECIL 
DREWERY EYRE WAS A GUEST IN THE AUTOMOBILE 
BEING DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT MICHAEL FRANK 
BURDETT. 
In his instruction No. 10 the Trial Court stated as 
follows: (R. 79) 
"You are instructed as a 1natter of law that 
the deceased Eyre was riding as a guest passenger 
in defendant's vehicle at the time and place of 
the accident." 
The court went on to instruct that the lawsuit of the 
estate of Cecil Drewery Eyre was based on allegations 
of wilful misconduct and intoxication of the defendant. 
(Instructions Nos. 7 and 16). Plaintiff requested in the 
alternative, instructions both that the deceased Cecil 
Drewery Eyre was a passenger as a matter of law (R. 
40) and leaving the question of whether the deceased 
was a guest or a passenger for the jury to determine 
(R. 46). 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
committed reversible error in holding as a matter of 
law that the deceased was a guest, according to the clear 
line of authorities to which this Court has committed 
itself. The only Utah case dealing with the question of 
whether an occupant is a guest or a passenger is the case 
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of Jensen vs. Mower (1956) 294 P. 2d 683, 4 U 2d 336. 
rr,his court held under the facts of that case that the 
plaintiff was a passenger and not a guest. In its opinion 
this court relied heavily on the California case inasmuch 
as the Guest Statute in California is substantially the 
same as the one in Utah. On page 688, the Court quotes 
from the leading California case of Whit1nore vs. French, 
(1951) 235 P. 2d 3, which in turn cites the case of Kruzie 
vs. Sanders (1943) 143 P 2d 704. The following language 
is stated from the Whitmore case: 
"Where, however, the driver receives a tangi-
ble benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a 
motivating influence for furnishing the transpor-
tation, the rider is a passenger and the driver is 
liable for ordinary negligence." 
The K ruzie case, supra, is one of the leading cases 
In California. In that case, the parties had been ac-
quainted for some tin1e, the defendants occasionally 
taking meals at a cafe operated by plaintiffs. In Decem-
ber, 1940, Mrs. Kruzie, the plaintiff~ ''as asked b·y ~Irs. 
Sanders, the defendant, to go with her to Fresno to 
assist her with some Christmas shopping. The defend-
ant told the plaintiff that she "ranted her advice in the 
selection of a ring as a present for defendanfs husband 
and also for her help in choosing presents for son1e 
girls. The plaintiff had no special kno"~Iedge of the 
jewelry business but she had good taste and she kne"\v 
"the sizes· and different things" appropriate as presents 
for the girls. After nearly a "\veek's urging plaintiff 
"vent with defendant, the plaintiff having done her ~hop-
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ping at a prior time. The trial court granted a non-suit 
against plaintiffs, and plaintiffs appealed on the question 
of whether plaintiff was a guest or a passenger. In 
rendering its decision the court stated at p. 706: 
"It is settled that benefits to the driver other 
than cash or its equivalent may be 'compensation' 
(citing cases). In the Druzanich case the sole 
benefit received by the driver was the promise 
of the passenger to share in the driving. In Haney 
v. Takakura, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1, 37 P 2d 170, 38 
P 2d 160, cited with approval in the Druzanich 
case, compensation was found where the defend-
ant driver asked the plaintiff to accompany him 
into town to assist in selling oranges. In the 
present case the evidence that plaintiff took the 
trip at defendant's request in order to aid defend-
ant with her Christmas shopping clearly shows a 
substantial benefit to defendant within the Druz-
anich and Haney decisions. * * * 
"Although Section 403 of the Vehicle Code 
defines a guest as a person who accepts a ride 
'without giving compensation for such ride,' it is 
not necessary, in order to avoid the prohibition 
of the statute, for plaintiff to establish that the 
compensation received by the driver was given 
'for such ride' in the sense that plaintiff obtained 
or purchased transportation for some independent 
purpose of her own. Where the trip was not 
primarily for a social purpose, it is sufficient 
to show that defendant was to derive a substan-
tial benefit from the transportation of plaintiff, 
and the fact that plaintiff received no benefit 
therefrom is immaterial. Guest statutes must be 
interpreted in accordance with the intention of 
the Legislature. A primary policy underlying 
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these statutes is to prevent recovery f?r ordinary 
negligence by a guest in an automobile wh? has 
accepted the hospitality of the owner or driver." 
In discussing the legislative purpose of the Guest 
Statute, this ·court, in the' J~nsen case, cited the following 
language from the case of Crawford vs. Foster, (Cal. 
1930), 293 P 841, at page 687: 
"The purpose and object that the Legislature 
had in mind sometimes throws light upon the 
meaning of the language used. The situation that 
this section was apparently designed to prevent 
is well lrnown. As the use of automobiles became 
almost universal, the proverbial ingratitude of 
the dog that bites the hand that feeds him, found 
a counterpart in the many cases that arose, where 
generous drivers, having offered rides to guests, 
later found themselves defendants in cases that 
often turned upon close questions of negligence. 
Undoubtedly, the Legislature, in adopting this 
act, reflected a certain natural feeling as to the 
injustice of such a situation. Neither this feeling 
nor the reasons therefor apply to a s-ituation 
arising out of an ordinary busi·ness transaction, 
* * *" . 
The Crawford case involved a situation where the 
plaintiff 'vas being taken for a de1uonstration ride by-
an agent of the defendant auton1obile dealer. The court 
in that case pointed out that the definition iu the statute 
does not say "'vithout pa~~ing therefor" but rather says 
''without giving colnpensation therefor" and that this 
language 'indicates an intention not to li1nit the srune to 
·a person definitely and specifically paying cash or its 
·equivalent for his transportation but to include in its 
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scope a person who gives such recompense for the ride 
as may be regarded as compensation therefor; that is, 
a return which may make it worth the other's while to 
furnish the ride. The court states : 
"A consideration may be any benefit con-
ferred or any prejudice suffered." 
In defining a guest the court stated: 
"We think the meaning of the language used 
is that a guest is one who is invited, either dir-
ectly or by implication, to enjoy the hospitality 
of a driver of a car; who accepts such hospitality; 
and who takes a ride either for his own pleasure 
or on his own business, without making any re-
turn to or conferring any benefit upon the driver 
of the car, other than the mere pleasure of his 
company." 
The California cases have distinguished a situation 
'vhere one of the objects of the trip is business from a 
situation where the trip is purely social. It was stated 
in the case of Whitechat v. Guyette, (Cal. 1942), 122 P 
2d 47, at page 49: 
"On the other hand, if the parties are engaged 
in a business venture for their mutual advantage 
and the ride is an integral part of that business 
venture, then the driver may be said to be in 
receipt of benefits sufficient to be classified as 
compensation, and the occupant becomes 'pas-
senger,' who may recover for injuries suffered 
as a result of the negligence of the driver.'' 
This case involved a situation where the purpose of the 
trip was to take the occupants to a meeting of an 
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organization, the driver receiving money from the organi-
zation to cover the costs of the trip. 
In the case of Druzanich v. Oriley, (Cal. 1942) 122 
P. 2d 53, the driver and other occupants were delegates 
from a Union going to a convention. The defendant's 
husband allowed her to use the car if the otl1ers would 
help in driving which they agreed to do. The court held 
that the appellant's promise "\vas the "special tangible 
benefit" which was the "motivating influence for furn-
ishing the transportation" and that this must be termed 
compensation. The court stated: 
"The instant case cannot be distinguished 
from the case of Lerma v. Flores, 60 P 2d 546, 
wherein the plaintiff was invited b~~ the defend-
ant to ride with him so that he (plaintiff) might 
show the defendant which route they should fol-
low, nor does it differ materially from the case 
of Haney vs. Takakura, 2 Cal. ..._-\._pp. :2d 1~ 37 P 
2d 170, in "\vhich the plaintiff, \\Tho had experience 
in selling oranges, "\vas asked to accompany the 
defendant driver into town to aid the defendant 
in selling his crop of oranges.~, 
The case of Walker cs. Ada1nson (Cal. 1937)~ 70 P. 
2d 914, involved a situation " ... here the plaintiff and 
defendant " ... ere business associates, having purchased 
real property at Lake Tahoe \\-i th t"-o n1ain houses and 
guest cottages, \\ ... hich the~ ... rented out and in ,vlrich they 
djvided the profits and shared the expenses. The purpose 
of the trip in question 'Yas to take hard"-are and other 
1naterials to carpenters 'vho " ... ere doing construction 
vvork on the property. The. defendant took }1is ear and 
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the plaintiff furnished some money for expenses. It was 
held that the evidence supported the verdict for the 
plaintiff on the theory that the parties were engaged 
on a business venture for their mutual advantage and 
that plaintiff was, therefore, a person who had given 
compensation for the transportation and not a guest. 
The case of Duclos v. Tashjian, Dist. Ct. of App. 
4th Dist. Cal. 1939, 90 P 2d 140, involved a situation 
where the deceased was an expert machinist and plain~ 
tiff owned a farm a short distance away. On the day 
in question the plaintiff came to deceased's place of 
business and asked him to come to his farm to look at 
his pump and see if he could fix it. The deceased took 
his tools and went with the defendant. The court held 
that the deceased was not a guest stating at page 143: 
"The journey was not undertaken by Tash-
jian as an act of hospitality nor as a favor, but 
as a real and vital part of his own business with 
an eye to his own benefit. It was participated in 
by Duclos, not as a means of obtaining free trans-
portation, but as an integral part of a business 
transaction. * * *. 
"An actual contract of employment of Duclos 
by Tashijian was no more necessary to constitute 
compensation for the ride in his car than was 
an actual sale of an automobile necessary in the 
Crawford case. Because some benefit from the 
trip may accrue to the rider iJs not controllivng. 
The statute does not so provide. A. prospective 
benefit to the rider does not compensate and de-
stroy by balancing an independent and separate 
compensation for the ride given by the rider to 
the driver. It is sufficient if, as here, the person 
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who accepts the ride gives compensation to the 
driver for it." 
The foregoing language shows that it is immaterial 
whether or not the passenger r~ceives any benefit from 
the ride. The controlling factor is whether or not the 
driver receives a benefit as defined in the cases. Further-
more the California cases indicate that in any business 
type situation there is a benefit within the Statute 
sufficient to make the occupant a passenger and not 
a guest. 
The case of Follansbee v. Benzenberg, Dist. Ct. App. 
2nd Dist. Div. 3. Cal. 1954, 265 P 2d 183, involved a 
situation where the hope of future business was held 
to be a present consideration sufficient to take the occu-
pant out of the guest status. In this case decedent bought 
a car from the defendant and the defendant's servant 
was taking the decedent to get his license plates. The 
court stated at page 186: 
'•An opportunity thus obtained is a direct and 
substantial benefit, and may "~en be as beneficial 
to the driver where he is selling something not 
necessarily connected "Tith the ride as "There he 
is de1nonstrating the car itself to a prospective 
purchaser or using it to take a prospect to look 
at a piece of land. The hope of future business 
is present, and such an opportunity is a real 
benefit to a salesn1an even though another place 
for his labors n1ight have been chosen. ~ ~ ~ 
It is enough that tlzerc is 'any· consideration for 
the ride." . 
In the case of Gilles pie v. Rau~li ngs (Cal. 1957), 
317 P. 2d 601, the plaintiff had ·worked for the defend-
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ant real estate broker as a receptionist and clerk for 
approximately four months. There was evidence that 
defendant 'vanted plaintiff to learn more about the busi-
ness so that she cpuld talk intelligently with customers. 
One of the objects of the trip in question was to see 
some real estate in another town. The defendant told 
the plaintiff that he wanted her to come on the trip. 
The defendant further testified that although he planned 
to see the property the purpose of the trip was primarily 
for pleasure. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was af-
firmed, the court holding that the jury properly decided 
that the purpose of plaintiff being in the car was to 
familiarize herself with the business and that she ac-
cepted the ride because of the employment relationship. 
See the following additional California cases which 
substantiate the foregoing propositions: 
Sumner v. Edmunds, 21 P. 2d 159, plaintiff being 
driven over paper route for purpose of familiarizing 
himself therewith-no contract of employment had been 
entered into-· held not a guest. 
Boysen v. Porter et al, Dist. Ct. of App. 2nd Dist., 
Div. 1, 1935, 52 P 2d 482-employee of committee to elect 
mayoralty candidate,-to which committee, owner lent 
~ruck and driver who operated in accordance with em-
ployee's directions-held not a guest. 
C.arey vs. City of Oakland, (Cal. 1941) 112 P 2d 
714-plaintiff was riding in the City ambulance to assist 
in· caring for an injured friend being taken to the hos-
pital-held evidence susceptible of the inference that 
the motivating influence which induced the officer in 
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charge of the ambulance to allow Mrs. Carey to go along 
and which prompted her to make the request was that 
she could and would render a beneficial service in assist-
ing him in caring for the unconcious Mrs. Gordon on 
the way to the hospital. The court cites the follo,ving 
at page 716: 
"In the case of McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. 
2d 279, 70 P 2d 909, the court in reviewing the 
origin, purpose and the construction place upon 
the operation of said law clearly points out, first, 
that such statutes, depriving a person carried 
without reward of the right to recover damages 
for injuries caused by failure to exercise ordin-
ary care, are in derogation of the common law, 
and therefore must not only be construed strictly 
against the change but its operation should not 
be extended beyond the correction of the evils 
and the attain1nent of the permissible social ob-
jects \vhich \Vere the inducing reasons for its 
enactment·" 
' 
Jensen vs. Hansen, Dist. Ct. of ..._\_pp. Fourth Dist. 
Cal. 1936, 55 P. 2d 1201 - Deceased riding ''ith defend-
ant - they and one other ''"·ere appraisers hired by· a 
loan company all three of "~hich had to 1nake any ap-
praisal. Frequently they "\vent together to see properties 
in the car of one or the other. Held-deceased not a quest 
since appraisals had to be signed by all and they had 
a good deal of appraisals that day and co1npensation 
could not be received until all three had signed. The 
presence of the three appraisers conferred a benefit on 
each of the1n by enabling all of thenz to receh·e their 
compensation 1nore prouzptly. 
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Martinez v. So. Pac. Co., (Cal. 1955) 288 P 2d 868. 
Action by daughter and daughter-in-law against father 
and minor son who was driving. Evidence showed that 
they all lived together as a family unit, the members 
contributing part of their wages to a common fund. The 
plaintiffs worked at a packing plant. They had a ride 
to work every 1norning which was stopped, and from 
that time on various members of the family group drove 
then1 to work. Held - sufficient evidence to justify a 
finding by the jury that they were passengers and not 
guests. 
Roberts v. Craig, Dist. Ct. of App. 1st Dist. Div. 1, 
Cal. 1954, 268 P. 2d 500 - Defendant had a limited 
instruction permit - law required her to have licensed 
driver in car when she drove - defendant wanted to 
drive to Martinez to pick up husband's salary checks -
asked plaintiff, a licensed driver to go with her- plain-
tiff had no business there. Held - jury justified in 
finding plaintiff a passenger. 
Thompson v. Lacey, (Cal., 1954) 267 P. 2d 4. 
JJ1alloy v. Fang (Cal., 1951) 232 P. 2d 241. 
Fachadio v. K rovitz, Dist. Ct. of App. 1st Dist. 
Div. 2, Cal. 1944, 144 P. 2d 646. 
The following cases from other jurisdictions are 
cited for the assistance of the court: 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stitzel, (1942) (Ind.) 41 
~.E. 2d 133 - Complaint alleged that plaintiff, a sales-
man for a furniture store, was riding with the defendant 
for the purpose of conducting her to a wholesale furni-
ture mart and helping her to select furniture, which 
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would then be sold to her by the plaintiff's employer-
held - could not be said as a matter of law that this 
was not such ~ substantial, material benefit to her as to 
pay her for plaintiff's transportation. 
Zaso vs. De Cola (Ohio) 51 NE 2 654-Defendant 
requested plaintiff, his sister, to come to his house to 
try to make peace for him with his wife - after she 
failed he was taking her home - held - benefit was 
tangible. 
Russell v. Pilget· (Vermont) 37 A 2d 403- Officer 
of law riding on defendant's milk truck to protect him 
during milk strike - held - passenger for hire. 
Scholz v. Leuer, (Wash.), 109 P. 2d 294- Plaintiff's 
decedent accompanied defendant on early morning de-
livery trip principally to help him by reading names 
of customers - fact that she wanted to go and that 
she might have regarded the venture as a lark, ''as 
said to be of little moment - held, substantial benefit 
to constitute payment. 
Cardinal v. Reinecke (~Iich.), 273 N\Y. 330--plaintiff 
in defendant's car at her request to advise defendant's 
daughter upon prospective en1ploy111ent - held - pas-
senger for hire. 
Goldberg v. Cook (1\finn.) 289 N\V'" 512 - 1nother 
traveling with daughter to '':rest Coast " ... here daughter 
planning to set up ne'\\r home - mother can1e solely to 
help daughter find a place and arrange it _ held _ 
passenger for hire. 
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Delk v. Young (Ohio) 35 NE · 2d · 969 - occupant 
-vvent. with driver who was a candidate for public office, 
to a meeting where they hoped to advance his candidacy 
- held - passenger for hire. 
O'Hagan v. Byron (Pa.) 33 A 2d 779 - plaintiff 
went with defendant, her sister, at defendant's request 
so. that she might give her opinion as to the health of 
their brother.-. held-· passenger for hire. 
Elkins v. Foster, (Texas) 101 SW 2 297- plaintiff 
accompanied defendant in defendant's car at defendant's 
request in order to discuss plain~iff's efforts to aid 
defendant's brother in retaini~g a position which would 
be of financial benefit· to ·defendant - held - passenger 
for hire~ 
Nyberg v. Kirby (Nev.) 188 P. 2d 1006- Plaintiff 
was requested to accompany defendant on trip to get 
supplies because defendant had been ill the same morn-
ing - held - not a guest - compensation even though 
plaintiff had actually performed little or nothing in the 
-vva y of services. 
Porter ·v. Tecker (Iowa), 270 NW 897- defendant 
asked plaintiff to accompany him to help load and un-
load truck - defendant injured on return trip - held 
-for jury. 
Wittrock v. Newcom (Iowa) 277 NW 286- defend-
·ti ant demonstrating car to plaintiff's · brother requested 
plaintiff to come along to as.sist in ·selling car -· held -
passenger for hire. 
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Mitchell v. Heaton (Iowa) 1 NW 2d 284- plaintiff 
"' ... ent with defendant because plaintiff's brother to whom 
defendant wished to sell a tractor refused to negotiate 
unless plaintiff was brought along - held - pa~senger 
for hire. 
Albrecht v. Safeway Stores (Ore.) (1938) 80 P. 2d 
62 - defendant was a district manager of defendant 
Safeway Stores- had to make inspection trips- asked 
plaintiff his brother-in-law to go on trip with him -
that he might need some help in driving - plaintiff did 
assist in driving and in loading sacks of salt in car -
held - jury question. 
Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead (Ohio) (1938)~ 
14 N.E. 211 - defendant driving to see a man on 
business, stopped in village - asked deceased and an-. 
other to ride "\\rith him to show him "There man lived-
held-defendant cannot claim the protection of Guest 
Statute. 
George v. Stanfield, et al (D. C. Idaho) ( S. D.~ 
1940) 33 F. Supp. 486 - defendant, a stock n1an~ asked 
plaintiff to go with hun to help lilln find the place 
where defendant wanted to go on business - held -
payment does not mean mone·y· or perfor1uance of a 
pecuniary obligation - not a guest either under Oreo-on 
0 
or Idaho Statutes. 
Palmer v. ll1illet·, 35 NE 2 104. 
Bailey v. Neale (Ohio), 25 NE 2310. 
Forsling v. lJ!ickelson (S. D.), 283 N\\ ... 169. 
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Van A1lker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co. 
(Neb.) 8 N.W. 2d 451. 
Lloyd v. Mowery (Wash.) (1930) 290 P. 710. 
Thompson v. Farrand (Iowa) (1933) 251 NW. 44. 
Bree v. Lamb (Conn. 1935) 178 A 919. 
Applying the law as set forth in the foregoing cases 
it can readily be seen that the trial court committed 
reversible error in holding as a matter of law that the 
deceased Cecil Drewery Eyre was a guest and; not a 
passenger. The evidence shows without dispute that the 
deceased who operated a chicken farm in Draper, Utah, 
consummated a sale of a case of eggs to the defendant. 
Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, the primary purpose of the trip to Draper was 
to pick up the eggs which had been sold to the defendant, 
and to bring them back to the B Z B lounge. Certainly, 
this vvas a mutual business transaction whereby the 
deceased was selling and defendant was buying the eggs 
in question. The evidence shows that the defendant was 
getting a good price on the eggs, and certainly, getting 
the eggs that night and at that pri·ce w,as substantial 
enough benefit for defendant to have considered it worth 
his time in driving out to the farm to get said eggs. It 
will be remembered that the evidence showed defendant 
and deceased had merely a slight acquaintance and that 
there was no social purpose whatsoever in the trip in 
question. Defendant stated at the trial that he was inter-
ested in going out to see the farm, although at the 
former hearing referred to in the record, defendant had 
made no such statement at all. It cannot be argued that 
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in such a transaction the buyer does not · benefit as 
well as the seller. In every sale of any type of product, 
it goes without saying, that both the seller and the buyer 
.benefit. Oth~rwise, there would be no buyers. It can be 
pointed out as an illustration of this., that as a matter 
of common knowledge, persons will travel many miles 
to participate in a bargain sale. Also, the hoards of 
people converging on the doors of department stores 
on mornings before sales can verify this well known 
fact. It cannot be said as a matter of law that there 
was no benefit accruing to the defendant in the trip in 
question. Maybe the jury could have found that these 
men put the egg transation off in some corner and 
decided as a purely collateral venture to go on an evening 
sightseeing tour of Eyre's hen yard. But we suggest to 
this Honorable Court that such a conclusion, to say the 
least, is some"\vhat unreasonable. 
It is of no n1oment in determining whether or not 
the decedent Eyre is a passenger, to state that he also 
benefited fron1 the trip. As "\\ras pointed out by the fore-· 
going authorities, the one and onl)~ question involved 
is whether or not the defendant Burdette benefitted from 
the trip. The cases clearly hold that in a business trans-
action where there is a Inutual benefit "·e do not have 
a. guest relationship. 
It will be remembered that the purpose of the guest 
statute was to prevent generous drivers giving rides 
to guests fro1n being sued for negligence. It "ill also 
be re1ne1nbered that since the guest statute is an abro-
gation of co1mnon la"\v and takes rights a"\vay fro1n per-
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sons which they had at common law, that it must be 
construed strictly within its narrow purpose. 
It was a gross injustice for the trial court in the 
case at bar to take away from the jury the question 
of whether or not the defendant Burdette benefitted from 
the trip in question and deciding as a matter of law 
that he did not. This was something which the trial court 
decided, on which all reasonable men could not agree. 
Many of the foregoing cases cited to this court for its 
assistance, contained instances where the benefits were 
less tangible than were the benefits in the case at bar. 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 INCORRE·CTLY ALLOWED THE 
JURY TO CONSIDER ALLEGED SCUFFLING BY DECED-
ENT AND ANOTHER OCCUPANT AS A DEFENSE WHEN 
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY ELIMINATED IT AS A 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Instruction No. 15 given by the court states as fol-
lows (R. 84) : 
"If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence in this case that at or immediately prior 
to the time of the collision, the plaintiff Massardi 
and the deceased Eyre were so conducting them-
selves as to interfere with the proper operation 
of the vehicle by the defendant Burdette and that 
such conduct on their part was a proximate con-
tributing cause of the accident, then and in that 
event you are instructed that the plaintiffs cannot 
recover and your verdict must be in favor of t4~ 
defendant and against both plaintiffs, no cause 
of action." 
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It will be remembered that the defendant Burdette 
testified that the accident happened on his side of the 
highway with the oncoming car coming across and into 
the car he was driving. In addition to this, on cross 
examination (R. 350) the defendant testified as follows: 
"Q. It was your testimony, as I understand it, 
that this accident happened so quick, when 
you first noticed these lights, there was noth-
ing you could do about it~ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. It was too late to do anything at all? 
A. I tried. 
Q. But it was too late~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you had of had tin1e you could have done 
something about it! 
A. I suppose I could." 
According to the defendant's own testimony the 
alleged scuffling that he spoke about could ha-ve had 
nothing whatsoever to do 'ritl1 tl1e l1appening of the 
accident. In the first place, the defendant testified that 
the accident happened on his side of the higlT\\Tay. There-
fore, there is nothing that the t""'"o occupants of the 
auton1obile could have done to have caused l1iln to go 
on to the wrong side of the higlr\vay. In the second 
place, the defendant states that the onco1uing car turned 
into his car so suddenly that he did not have time to 
attempt to do anything about it. Therefore, according 
to defendant's own testimony there is nothing that the 
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two occupants of the automobile could have done to 
have prevented him from avoiding the accident. Cer-
tainly, it is well established law that a party's testimony 
is no stronger than its weakest link. The defendant is 
bound by his own testimony and his case must stand 
or fall with it. It will be remembered also that the 
only testimony in the entire record concerning any scuf-
fling by the two occupants was the testimony of the 
defendant himself. Then, the defendant went on to testify 
that there was nothing that this alleged scuffling could 
have had to do with the cause of the accident. For this 
reason, the instruction given as aforesaid by the trial 
court was prejudicial error, since it was not justified 
according to the evidence in the case. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON NEGLIGENCE AF'TER HAVING ELIMINATED 
NEGLIGENCE FROM THE LAWSUIT. 
After the trial court had eliminated any question of 
negligence from the lawsuit by ruling and instructing 
as a matter of law that the deceased Cecil Drewery Eyre 
was a guest and not a passenger, it went on to give 
the following instructions, Instruction No. 4 in part 
(R. 72) : 
"The terms 'negligence,' 'contributory negli-
gence,' 'ordinary care,' and 'proximate cause,' as 
used in these instructions, are defined as follows : 
(a) ~Negligence' means the failure to do what 
a reasonably prudent person would have 
done under the circumstances of a situa-
ation, or doing what such person under 
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such existing circumstances would not 
have done. The essence of the fault may 
lie in acting or omitting to act. The .duty 
is dictated and measured by the e:ngen-
cies of the occasion ; '' 
Instruction No. 7 in part (R. 75) : 
"Under the law of the State of Utah at the 
time of the accident in question, it was the duty 
of a driver of a motor vehicle to keep a lookout 
for other vehicles or conditions reasonably to be 
anticipated upon the highway, to keep his car at 
all times under reasonably safe and proper con-
trol, to drive his car on his own right side of 
the highway, and to maintain a speed -within that 
set by law for any particular locality. A violation 
of any one or more of these requirements would 
constitute negligence on the part of the driver. 
"To prevail on a claim of "Wilful misconduct 
on the part of the defendant, the plaintiffs have 
the burden of showing to you by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that such act or acts of negli-
gence as referred to above were committed under 
such circumstances as to constitute "ilful mis-
conduct. In this connection -vou are directed to 
the definition of wilful 1nis~onduct given in in-
struction No. 5." 
Instruction No. 11 (R. 80) : 
"Con~uct arising fron1 1110111entary thought-
lessness, 1nadve:r-tence, or fro1n error of judg1nent 
does not, standing alone, indicate "?ilful Iniscon-
duct. If, t_herefo~e, y~u find fron1 a preponderance 
of the eVIdence 1n this case that the accident was 
caused by nothing Inore than the defendant's 
momenta~y thoughtlessness, inadvertence, 0 r 
error of JUdgment, there can be no recoverv and 
.. 
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your verdict should be in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action." 
Instruction No. 16 (R. 85) : 
"Even should you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence in this case that the defendant 
was negligent and that such negligence 'vas a 
proximate cause of the accident, the court in-
structs you that such evidence alone is not suffi-
cient. In this case you must find either that the 
defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct or was 
intoxicated as defined in these instructions, and 
that such wilful misconduct or intoxication proxi-
mately caused the accident. If all you find is 
that the defendant was guilty ·of negligence, your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action." 
It is well established in Utah as well as in other 
States that it is error to give instructions which are 
extraneous to the issues and evidence in the case. .After 
eliminating negligence from the case, it was improper 
for the trial court to dwell at great length, as he did, 
in instructing the jury as to what negligence was. The 
only two issues remaining in the case were wilful mis-
conduct and driving under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. The case of Moore v. D g. R. G. W. (1956) 4 U. 
2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849, in discussing two instructions 
given in said case, one, to the effect that since this was 
an F.E.L.A. case that the plaintiff was not covered by 
Workmen's Compensation, and two, that plaintiff -did 
not assume the risk, stated that though the statements 
of law contained in said instructions were correct, they 
were extraneous to the issues of the case and it was 
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error to give them. The court in the Moore case cited 
the case of Parker vs. Bamberger, et al, (1941) 100 U. 
361, 116 P. 2d 425, where it was stated at page 430: 
"As to the first point, it is error for the 
trial court to give an instruction, though such 
instruction correctly states the la-,v, on a matter 
extraneous to the issues and evidence of the case." 
Also, cited in the Moore case was tl1e case of Bruner 
vs. McCarthy, 105 U. 399, 142 P. 2d 649. 
It will be observed from the foregoing instructions 
that the court, in instructing on negligence and repeat-
edly stating that the plaintiffs had to prove more than 
mere negligence, made the burden of the plaintiffs in 
the case seem almost insurmountable. In the first part 
of Instruction No. 7 the court stated: 
"Under our la"· a guest cannot recover fro1n 
his host driver for 1nere negligence, that is~ the 
failure to exercise ordinary care in the operation 
of a vehicle. Before a guest can recover, he or 
she must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the driver 'vas guilty of wilful mis-
conduct or of being intoxicated "~hich proxiluately 
caused the injury co1nplained of.~~ 
Certainly, this part of Instruction No. 7 "·as entirely 
sufficient to instruct the jury that a quest cannot recove1· 
for mere negligence. Subsequent to this it ,vas only 
necessary for the court to instruct the jury as to "~hat 
they must find to find 'vilful 1nisconduct or intoxication. 
However, the court \Yent on to confuse the jury by stating 
at great length what negligence 'vas under certain condi-
tions and then to instruct the jury that they must find 
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more than this in order to hold for the plaintiffs. This 
created confusion and misunderstanding in the mind of 
the jury and was extremely prejudicial to plaintiff. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 6 WHICH STATED THAT 
DRIVING A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF LIQUOR IS NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW-
THIS AFTER HAVING ELIMINATED NEGLIGENCE AS 
BEING ACTIONABLE. 
The argument under this point is based on the same 
law as was cited under the preceding point but it was 
felt necessary to deal with this error by the trial court 
separately. The trial court instructed in Instruction 
No. 6 (R. 74) as follows: 
"A person who drives a vehicle upon a public 
highway while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
One is under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
when, as the result of drinking thereof, his abili-
ties of perception, coordination, or of will or 
judg1nent, are so affected as to impair, to an 
appreciable degree, his ability to operate the 
vehicle with a degree of care which an ordinary 
prudent person in full possession of his faculties 
would exercise under similar circumstances." 
It can be seen from the foregoing instruction that 
the trial court has added to the confusion which he had 
created by delving into the question of negligence by 
instructing that a person driving a vehicle under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor is guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law. The court failed to state that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
,plaintiffs would be entitled to recover if such a finding 
''Tere made. Irreparable prejudice was created for the 
plaintiff when this instruction is considered with the 
other instructions which emphatically emphasize that 
plaintiff could not recover for mere negligence. 
The trial court emphatically instructed the jury 
that plaintiff could not recover for mere negligence. 
The court then instructed the jury that driving while 
under the influence of intoxicants "is negligence as a 
matter of law." If driving while under the influence 
of intoxicants is negligence as a matter of law and the 
plaintiff cannot recover for mere negligence then the 
plaintiff cannot recover under the court's instructions 
even though plaintiff proves that defendant was driving 
while under the influence of intoxicants and that his 
conduct in such regard proximately caused the collision. 
At no place in the instructions is the jury clearly 
advised that if defendant 'vas driving while under the 
influence of intoxicants and his conduct in that regard 
proximately caused the collision plaintiff would be en-
titled to recover. The only portion of Instruction No. 
16 discussing the subject states: .. In this case you 1nust 
find either that the defendant "~as guilty of wilful Inis-
conduct or "ras intoxicated as defined in these instruc-
tions, and that such "'"illful 1uisconduct or intoxication 
proximately caused the accident." This portion of the 
instruction does not advise the jury that plaintiff is 
entitled to recover on proof of intoxication and causation. 
But even if such an inference were deducible from said 
language standing alone that meaning is lost " .. hen the 
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court advises the jury in the same instruction "If all 
you find is that the defendant was guilty of negligence, 
your verdict must be in favor of the defendant * * *." 
_..._t\..nd, of course, the jury had previously been instructed 
that driving while under the influence of intoxicants was 
"negligence as a matter of la \V ." 
Further1nore, it is not incumbent upon the plaintiff 
to establish that the meaning hereinabove set forth is 
the only meaning that could be attached to the instruc-
tions. It is only incumbent upon the plaintiff to demon-
strate that said meaning could have been given the 
instructions by the jury. It is so obvious as to be beyond 
the possibility of dispute that the jury could have be-
lieved fron1 the instructions that driving while under 
the influence of intoxicants is negligence and that for 
mere negligence plaintiff 'vould not be entitled to recover. 
It is true that part of this instruction was con-
tained in plaintiff's requested instruction No. 9 (R. 50). 
However, a note was appended to said request (R. 51) 
which stated: 
'"NOTE : This instruction to be given if the 
Court leaves the question of whether Eyre was a 
guest or a passenger to the jury." 
Certainly, with negligence having been eliminated from 
the case, the foregoing instruction was extraneous to 
the issues and created irreparable prejudice to the plain-
tiff 'vhich constituted reversible error by the trial court. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REV-ERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ALLOWING THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
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TO BE GIVEN THE JURY, AND COMPOUNDED ITS ERROR 
IN UNDULY EMPHASIZING THIS DEFENSE IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS. 
The defense of assumption of risk has been defined 
at 15 A.L.R. 2d 1180, as follows : 
"The necessary elements of assumption of 
risk by the guest have been clearly defined as 
follows: 
"First, there 1nust be a hazard or danger in-
consistent with the safety of the guest; Second, 
the guest must have a knowledge and apprecia-
tion of the hazards ; and Third, there must be ac-
quiescence or willingness on the part of the guest 
to proceed in the face of danger. Knipfer v. Shaw 
( 1933) 210 Wis. 617, 246 N\\"'" 328, 2-!7 XW 320." 
In this regard it will be remembered that the defend-
ant Burdette testified that he was perfectly sober 
throughout the trip in question, having had nothing 
more than two short beers at the B Z B bar before 
leaving on the trip in question and that said short 
beers consisted of half foan1 and half beer and that he 
had not finished either one of the1n. The only other 
witness, Lorene ~lassardi, stated that she sa"~ Burdette 
take two drinks fro1n a glass about four inches tall 
approximately half full and that she could not tell 
whether it was "~hiskey or beer (R. 2-!2). Sh~ further 
testified that during the trip she did not see anyone 
in the car take any drinks (R. 244). l\Irs. :Jiassardi had 
no n1e1nory of the events iinmediately preceding the 
accident (R. 247). She ren1embered that at one point 
Mr. Burdette had driven too fast and that she had 
objected and that they had stopped at a filling station 
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and Burdette had stated that he wouldn't drive so fast, 
but she is quite hazy as to when and where this happened 
(R. 231, 247). It will also be remembered that the total 
evidence in the record as to the manner in which Burdette 
was driving prior to the accident covered his driving 
from the bottom of Bennion Hill on the South up and 
over the hill to the point of the accident. There is no evi-
dence in the record as to any reckless or heedless driving 
prior to that time. 
There is also testimony in the record by defendant 
Burdette and Lorene Massardi to the effect that de-
ceased Eyre and Massardi had consumed a fair amount 
of liquor during the afternoon and evening preceding 
the accident (R. 241, 300, 304, 306, 310). With the record 
in this state, the trial court gave the following instruc-
tions: 
"Instruction No. 12 (R. 81) 
"If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant was guilty of wilful 
misconduct as herein defined, you will be required 
to determine whether the plaintiffs voluntarily 
assumed the risk of such misconduct of the de-
fendant. If so, they are barred from recovering in 
this action. In making such determination you will 
bear in mind that there must be a knowing con-
currence by them in the wilfulness of the driver's 
conduct and a knowing acceptance of the hazard. 
In other words, the guest, to be barred from 
recovery under this rule, must have knowledge 
at the time of the ride, of the facts that make 
it perilous and must have sufficient experience 
and understanding to appreciate the dangerous 
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character of the conduct and with this knowledge 
and appreciation, they nevertheless a~sumed the 
risk incident to the driver's wilful misconduct." 
"Instruction No. 13 (R. 82) 
"There is a legal principle connnonly referred 
to by the term 'assumption of risk' \vhich is as 
follows: 
"One is said to assume a risk when he volun-
tarily manifests his assent to dangerous conduct 
or to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous 
condition and voluntarily exposes himself to that 
danger, or when he knows, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should know, that a danger exists 
in either the conduct or condition of another, 
or in the condition, use or operation of property 
and voluntarily places himself or remains within 
the position of danger. 
"One \vho has thus assUllled a risk is not 
entitled to recover for da1nage caused lrin1 with-
out intention and "-hich results from the danger-
ous condition or conduct to "'"hich he thus exposed 
himself." 
"Instruction No. 14 (R. 83) 
''When upon entering a vehicle to accept a 
ride as a guest one knozcs, or reasonably should 
knou·., that the driver is i·nto:ricated. the law holds 
that the guest assu1nes the hazard and, therefore, 
1nay not recover in the eYent of injury or death 
resulting fron1 the driYer·s intoxication. The sa1ne 
result also follo'\\"S "-hen, after having entered a 
vehicle, a guest learns, or reasonablY should be 
aware, that the driver is intoxicat~d and the 
guest having a reasonable opportunity' to alight 
at a reasonably safe place, fails to do so thus 
voluntarily accepting the risks incident to the 
driver's intoxication h~ .. continuino- to ride ,Yith 
1 . ,, b lUll. , 
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The evidence conclusively shows that the decedent 
Eyre had no notice of drinking on the part of Burdette 
or of any wilful 1nisconduct in driving the automobile 
prior to the time when the defendant commenced the 
wild ride over Bennion Hill at which time it was entirely 
too late to make any protest or to get out of the auto-
mobile. It will also be remembered that Burdette testified 
under oath that he 'vas absolutely sober. For the defend-
ant Burdette to avail himself of the defense of assump-
tion of risk as to his intoxication he must take a 
position that he may avail himself of his own perjury 
and benefit therefrom. With the record in this state, 
it was improper for the trial court to instruct on 
assumption of risk at all. The court not only wrongfully 
instructed on assumption of risk but compounded its 
error by giving three separate instructions on this de-
fense and, in effect, drilling it into the minds of the 
jurors. The · prejudice resulting to the plaintiff from 
these three instructions is patent on the face of said 
instructions. 
This court in the case of Shoemaker v. Floor ( 1950) 
117 U. 434, 217 P. 2d 382, affirmed the trial judge's 
findings as to lack of assumption of risk in a case where 
the plaintiff stated that she had gone out 'vith the 
defendant on several previous occasions and that on 
such occasions he nearly alvvays had something to drink; 
that the only effect that the drinking had upon him 
which she noticed was that it caused him to drive faster; 
that she saw him take three drinks in Pocatello during 
the course of an hour and a half prior to the trip in 
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question; that she had no reason to anticipate that there 
might be any drinking on the trip when she left Salt 
Lake City for Pocatello; and that, although she had 
seen him take three drinks, she had seen him take three 
drinks containing the same amount of liquor on previous 
occasions without his appearing or acting other than 
normal. Moreover, it has been held in a great number 
of cases that mere knowledge that the driver has been 
drinking is not sufficient to preclude recovery under the 
Guest Statutes as the trial court here instructed in 
Instruction No. 14 See 15 ALR 2d 1169, par. 4. The 
authorities hold that the extent of the knowledge must 
be such that the guest has knowledge or "\\ith the exercise 
of reasonable care should have knowledge that the driver 
i~ so under the influence of intoxicants as to be unfit 
to operate his car. 15 ALR 2d 1170, par. 5. 
In the case of Stack v. ]{ earnes (1950) 118 U 237, 
221 P. 2d 594, this court upheld a jury finding of no 
assumption of risk as to the defendanfs 'vilful miscon-
duct when it \\~as sho"\\rn by the evidence that on the 
same trip the defendant had driven at an excessive 
rate of speed, at "~hieh tunes, plaintiff has requested 
hi1n to slo"r do,\rn, and that there \\~as an opportunity 
to leave the car prior to the return trip. The court 
particularly noticed the fact that there 'vas no oppor-
tunity for plaintiff to get out of the auto1nobile after 
it had beco1ne evident to hiin that the defendant did 
not intend to heed his request as he had done before. 
It will be reme1nbered that the evidence in the case at 
bar sho,Ys that there "~Its no opportunity "Thatsoever 
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for the decedent to leave the car of defendant after 
defendant started on his wild drive over Bennion Hill 
to the point of the accident. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS A DE-
FENSE TO AN ACTION BASED ON WILFUL MISCONDUCT 
AND INTOXICATION. 
The trial court stated in Instruction 7 in part as 
follows (R. 75) : 
"* * * If the plaintiffs should prevail in your 
finding as to either the issue of intoxication or 
that of wilful misconduct as a proximate cause 
of injuries or damages suffered by them, they 
will be entitled to recover damages unless they, 
or either of them, are barred from relief by con-
tri~butory negligence, if any, or by an assumption 
of the risk, if such there was under the instruc-
tions given you." 
It will be noted in the instruction that the court had 
originally used the word "misconduct" and had crossed 
it out writing the word "negligence'' above it. Further-
more, the court in Instruction 4 part b, defined contribu-
tory negligence as follows (R. 72): 
" 'Contributory negligence' means that a per-
son injured has proximately contributed to such 
injury by his want of ordinary care, so that except 
for such want of ordinary care on his part the 
injury would not have resulted." 
In the aforesaid instructions, the trial court clearly 
committed reversible error which was prejudicial to the 
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plaintiff. In Instruction No. 7, the trial court instructed 
the jury that there were two separate defenses which 
the defendant had to the action, contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk. It is true that there have been 
a few authorities which have used the words "contribu-
tory negligence" and "assumption of risk" interchange-
ably. However, there are no authorities found which 
have given a defendant both such defenses. The universal 
rule is that contributory negligence is not a defense to 
an action based upon wilful misconduct. This is stated 
at 38 Am. Jur. 854, par. 178: 
"There is an abundance of authority for the 
proposition that contributory negligence is not 
a defense in an action based upon "~ul or wanton 
misconduct or intentional violence. Even in juris-
dictions where the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence is rejected as a general principle of the 
comn1on la,v, contributory negligence is no de-
fense to an action based on the defendant's reck-
less, wilfuL "Tanton, or intentional misconduct. 
There is no more reason for permitting the de-
fense of contributory negligence in a case where 
the injury 'vas caused by 'villfut " ... anton, or 
reckless 1uisconduct than there is for perinit-
ting it in a case of a~saul t and battery.~~ 
It is also stated at 114 A.L.R. 837: 
"IIov{ever~ even in jurisdictions " ... here the 
doctrine of co1nparative negligence is repudiated, 
it is conceded that contributory negligence is no 
defense to an action based on defendant's reckless, 
'vilfuL wanton, or intentional n1isconduct. ~' 
N n1nerous authorities are cited substantiating the 
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aforesaid statements. Also see Loomis v. Church (Idaho, 
1954) 277 p. 2d 561. 
It is well known Hornbook law that the aforesaid 
statement is a sound and correct statement of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error in hold-
ing as a matter of law that the deceased, Cecil Drewery 
Eyre, was a guest in the automobile of the defendant, 
when the evidence clearly showed that a benefit accrued 
to the defendant from a trip which amounted to a joint 
business venture. Subsequently, the trial court in its 
instructions, in effect, directed a verdict against the plain-
tiff by instructing on matters that were extraneous to 
the issues of the lawsuit such as the alleged scuffling, 
vvhich according to defendant's own testimony had noth-
ing to do with the accident and the detailed instructions 
on negligence after having eliminated negligence from 
the lawsuit and in particular, Instruction 6, which 
stated that driving a vehicle while under the influence 
of liquor is negligence as a matter of law. 
The court proceeded to erroneously instruct on the 
defense of assumption of risk with the evidence showing, 
first, that there was nothing for the decedent to be 
alarmed at concerning the sobriety of the defendant 
and, second, that the evidence clearly showed that, after 
the defendant started his wilful misconduct, the plain-
tiff had no opportunity to get out of the automobile. 
It \vill be remembered that the defendant himself testi-
fied that the plaintiffs had no cause for alarm either 
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as to his sobriety or as to his driving during the trip 
to the ranch and back again. In effect, defendant is given 
the advantage of being able to state "even if you believe 
I lied under oath, you may still hold that the deceased 
assumed the risk of my drunkeness and wilful miscon-
duct." The trial court not only wrongfully instructed on 
assumption of risk but greatly over· emphasized the 
defense in three separate instructions, stating it over and 
over again thereby creating irreparable prejudice to the 
plaintiff. 
The court further erred in instructing the jury that 
contributory negligence is a defense to an a~tion based 
on wilful misconduct and intoxication. This instruction 
was clearly erroneous under the universal line of 
authority on the subject. It is a basic principle of the 
law of negligence that contributory negligence is only 
a defense to a negligent act and is not a defense to an 
act of wilful misconduct. 
Plaintiff was not given a fair trial because of the 
numerous errors conunitted by the trial court and is 
entitled to have the case heard again before a jury 
correctly and adequately instructed on the la'v governing 
the case. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorneys/o1· Pla-intiff and Appellant 
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